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Abstract
This paper provides new information about the interrelated issues of teacher turnover (both
within and across school districts and inside and outside of teaching) and the importance of nonpecuniary school characteristics, such as race and poverty, using new administrative data on Georgia
teachers and the elementary schools in which they teach. Simple descriptive statistics indicate that
teachers are more likely to change schools if they begin their teaching careers in schools with lower
student test scores, schools with lower income students, or schools that have higher proportions of
minority students. A linear probability and a competing risks model of transitions out of first
teaching jobs allow us to separate the importance of these highly correlated school characteristics.
The estimates from the model imply that teachers are much more likely to exit schools with large
proportions of minority students, and that the other univariate statistical relationships associated with
student test scores and poverty rates are driven to a large extent by the correlations of these variables
with the minority variable. Thus we find that, while the common notion that teachers are more likely
to leave high poverty schools is correct, it occurs because teachers are more likely to leave a
particular type of poor school - that which has a large proportion of minority students.

I. Introduction
Most prior research related to the decisions of teachers has focused on the binary outcome of
whether an individual decides to leave the teaching occupation. The motivation for such research
was often a concern about the supply of teachers, and much attention was paid to the relationship
between earnings and teacher attrition.

However, teachers who remain in teaching do make

decisions that are important for policy. For example, given recent evidence about the importance of
teachers, the high levels of sorting of student groups across schools, and the concern with the
educational opportunities of students from disadvantaged backgrounds, obtaining a better
understanding of the factors associated with movements of inexperienced teachers between schools is
an important research topic.1
This paper provides new information about the interrelated issues of teacher
turnover/mobility and the importance of non-pecuniary school characteristics, such as race and
poverty, using administrative data on Georgia teachers and on the elementary schools in which they
teach. Our particular interest is in documenting how attrition patterns vary across types of schools.
As such, we examine exits from individual schools (i.e. both teaching job changes within and across
school districts as well as various types of exits out of teaching).

1

The importance of teachers, and in particular inexperienced teachers, in explaining differential educational
outcomes has been demonstrated in several studies (Ferguson 1991; Ferguson and Ladd 1996; Rivkin et al. 1998;
Sanders, Saxton, and Horn 1997; Sanders and Horn 1998; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2003).
There is a large degree of racial segregation in public elementary schools in Georgia. The index of
dissimilarity for black and white students in Georgia public schools was 62.1 in the 2000-01 school year (Freeman,
et al., 2002). This index number implies that 62.1 percent of Georgia public elementary school students would have
to change schools in order for there to be an equal racial makeup in all Georgia public schools. Freeman, et al. also
report high degrees of segregation by income class as well. Metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest tend to
have the most racially segregated schools (Clotfelter, 1999).
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To understand the relationship between non-pecuniary characteristics of schools and teacher
decisions, examining exits from individual schools is important because we find that approximately
63 percent of all teaching changes take place within a district. Further, substantial variation in nonpecuniary school characteristics exist among schools within districts; in 1995, eighty percent of the
variation in 3rd grade test scores in the state of Georgia came from within-district variation, 41.3
percent of the variation in the proportion of students in a school who are black came from withindistrict variation, and 64.6 percent of the variation in the proportion of students in a school who are
in poverty came from within-district variation.
Further, when mobility is modelled at a district level it becomes difficult in empirical work to
know what current school characteristics to “attach” to a person who is considering a district change
if substantial variation in school characteristics exists within districts and mobility within districts is
common. For example, for a teacher who is currently working in a school with the most desirable
characteristics in a district, it seems likely that the characteristics that are relevant when considering a
district change are the characteristics in her particular school (since these are likely to be the
characteristics that she will continue to have if she stays in the district). However, a teacher who is
working in a school with the least desirable characteristics in the district is not likely to base the
decision of whether to leave the district entirely on the characteristics at her current school if she
thinks that, in the future, she may be able to move to a school in the district which has more desirable
characteristics. In this case, deciding what characteristics are relevant for the decision is difficult
from a practical standpoint. This particular measurement difficulty is avoided when mobility is
modelled at the school level. Other recent research that examines movements out of particular
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schools includes Lankford et al. (2002) and Hanushek et al. (2004), which use data from New York
State and Texas respectively.2
After describing our data in Section II, our empirical investigation in Section III begins by
examining the types of univariate tabulations that also appear in the papers by Lankford et al. (2002)
and Hanushek et al. (2004). We find that teachers are more likely to change schools–both within and
across districts–if they begin their teaching careers in schools with lower student test scores, schools
with lower income students, or schools that have higher proportions of minority students.
A primary contribution of our work is the use of a linear probability model and a competing
risks model that allow us to examine the relative importance of these highly correlated school
characteristics in explaining exits out of first schools.3 We find that teachers are much more likely to
exit schools with large proportions of minority students, and that the relationships found for student
test scores and poverty rates in the univariate tabulations are being driven to a large extent by the fact
that these variables are highly correlated with the proportion of minority students in a school. More
specifically, the results from both our linear probability model and competing risks model indicate
that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of black students in a school increases the
probability that a “median type” teacher will exit a particular school in a particular year by more than
twenty percent, whereas one standard deviation changes in student test scores, poverty, or teacher
pay lead to only small changes in the overall exit probability.

2

In earlier work, Theobald (1990) and Mont and Rees (1996) estimated models that explain the decisions of teachers
in Washington state and New York state, respectively, to leave their school districts. Both of these studies combined
attrition from teaching and moves across districts and did not consider moves within districts. Theobald and Gritz
(1996) and Gritz and Theobald (1996) estimated models that explain the relationship between personal and school
characteristics and the decisions of teachers in Washington state to move to a different school district, to move into
public school administration, or to exit the state public education system.
3
In terms of approaches that are closest to that of this paper, Hanushek et al. (2004) use data on Texas elementary
teachers and schools to estimate multinomial logit models of teacher transitions out of school districts and out of
teaching. Their competing risks results do not examine moves within districts. We became aware that Hanushek et
al. (2004) were also working on this topic after completing an earlier draft of this paper.
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Thus, our use of these models allows us to say something very specific about the common
suggestion that teachers are more likely to leave high poverty schools. Our empirical work indicates
that, while this suggestion is true, it occurs because teachers are more likely to leave a particular type
of poor school - one that has a large proportion of minority students. More generally, the main
policy point of our paper is that, if one is interested in understanding mobility and attrition, it is of
utmost importance to understand what is happening at schools with high proportions of minority
students.

Section IV provides concluding remarks including a discussion of whether high attrition

rates at minority schools are likely to be indicative of low quality education at these schools.

II. Data
To analyze the mobility and retention of new elementary school teachers, we merged three
sources of data on all public elementary schools teachers and all public elementary schools in
Georgia.4 Data on the characteristics of individual teachers from the 1991-92 school year to the
2000-01 school year were obtained from the administrative records kept by the Georgia Professional
Standards Commission (GAPSC). Characteristics of individual elementary schools from 1994-95 to
2000-2001, including racial composition, average student achievement on standardized exams, and
percentage of students eligible for free or reduced lunch were provided by the Georgia Department of

4

Georgia is in many ways roughly an “average” state. Georgia’s median household income in 1999 was about
$39,500, ranking 26th in the U.S. Women working in Georgia earned $934 more than the national median for
women. Georgia students in the 3rd, 5th, and 8th grades scored very close to or at the national average on the battery
of Stanford 9 exams administered in 2001 (Georgia Department of Education, 2002). Almost 83 percent of Georgia
residents have at least a high school diploma, compared to 84 percent nationwide. According to the National
Education Association, teacher salaries in Georgia are slightly below the national average, the highest in the
southeast, and 17th highest in the nation (Salzer, 2001). The rate of adults over age 25 with at least a college degree
is lower in Georgia relative to the nation–23.1 percent in Georgia and 25.6 percent overall. Georgia differs from the
rest of the nation with respect to homeownership and racial composition as well. In 1999, 71.3 percent of Georgians
owned their homes compared to a rate of 66.8 percent nationally. Nationally, 30.9 percent of individuals are
nonwhite or of mixed race, compared to 37.4 percent of Georgians. Unless otherwise noted, all information in this
footnote comes from the U.S. Department of the Census web site, www.census.gov.
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Education (GADOE). Actual quarterly wages paid to the teachers and former teachers comes from
administrative payroll records from the state unemployment insurance (UI) system maintained by the
Georgia Department of Labor (GADOL). These data are referred to as ES202 data.5 Virtually all
employees are subject to the UI tax, and thus virtually all wages in non-teaching occupations are
observed. The ES202 data identify the industry (4-digit SIC code), but not the occupation of each
individual.6
Merging these three sources of data allows us to differentiate between the reasons that a
teacher may leave his/her first teaching job.

If an individual is no longer working as a full-time

teacher, but receives wages from a public school district, we classify him/her as working in “other
education sector employment.” If a former teacher does not have a wage in the ES202 file, then
he/she is either living in Georgia but not working, living in another state and not working, living in
another state and working as a teacher, or living in another state and working in a non-teaching
occupation. The data do not allow us to differentiate between these possibilities so we group them
together in a “leaving the Georgia workforce” category. Note that we also classify individuals who

5

The ES202 data are described in detail by White and Geddes. (1990). All employers covered in the unemployment
insurance system report each employee’s wages to the GADOL on a quarterly basis. The ES202 data identify the
industry (4-digit SIC code), but not the occupation of each individual. Using ES202, the actual wages paid to
teachers and former teachers were matched with the teacher records in the GAPSC files by social security number.
For individuals listed in the GAPSC files as teachers for a given year, the match of wages to teachers was almost
perfect–of the roughly 820,000 teacher records over the 10-year period, only 7 records could not be matched to
wage information in the ES202 data files.
6
Each record in the GAPSC data contains a job code, which is used to determine which individuals are teaching.
Nevertheless, a large number of these teachers have low actual wages as reported by ES202. Perhaps these teachers
were working for only part of the academic year. Since we do not know why these individuals are not earning a
full-time annual teaching wage, we did not want to characterize their wage necessarily as their observed annual
wage. Teaching wages are observed quarterly in the ES202 data: January-March, April-June, July-September, and
October-December. Georgia teachers are paid on 12-month contracts. Since the quarterly data do not match the
school year, care had to be taken in constructing annual teaching wages. In the 3rd quarter of the calendar year, the
ES202 data will contain wages for teachers from two different academic years. To avoid this issue and the issue of
teachers leaving in the middle of an academic year, we took the highest quarterly teaching wage from the other three
quarters and annualized that figure. Teachers making decisions on whether to leave the profession surely consider
the wage they would be paid for the entire academic year as the wage offered in teaching. One drawback of using
actual wage information is that some variation in wages is true differences in wages across districts, while some
variation is due to differences in educational attainment. In our data, just over 90 percent of the sample of new
teachers never earned more than a bachelor’s degree during the same period. We also conducted our analyses with
only these teachers and obtained very similar results to those reported in this paper.
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earn less than $10,000 in annual wages as having left the Georgia workforce. Individuals who earn
wages outside the Georgia public education sector are labelled as working in the “non-education
sector.” Finally, the data allow us to identify the particular school and school district in which the
teacher is employed so we are able to differentiate between exits to a new school within the district
and to a new school in another district.
We study the seven years between the 1994-95 academic year and the 2000-01 academic
year. Our sample contains 11,070 elementary teachers who began teaching between 1994-95 and
1999-00 in Georgia and were under the age of 27 when they began their teaching career.7
Variable definitions and summary statistics of the characteristics of teachers and their schools
are listed in Table 1. We report summary statistics from the first year of each first teaching job. As
shown in Table 1, individuals on average work in schools in which 0.464 of students live in poverty
(POVERTY), i.e. eligible for free or reduced price lunch, and 0.388 of students are black
(PBLACK). The mean percentile rank on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (TEST) at teachers’ first
schools is 53.28.8 Our sample of new teachers is overwhelmingly female (87.5 percent), and only
16.7 percent of teachers identify themselves as non-Hispanic blacks (BLACK).9 Mean wages in the
first year of teaching are approximately $30,000, in constant year 2000 dollars.
Table 2 contains the number of teachers in each of the transition categories under study. For
the six annual cohorts in the data, we observe a minimum of one, a maximum of 6, and an average of
3.46 yearly decisions before the end of the sample period, which takes place in 2000-2001 school
year. Defining a teaching job to be employment at a particular school, a teacher is defined to make a
7

Limiting our sample to teachers aged 27 or younger, essentially ensures that our new teachers have not previously
taught in Georgia. We cannot rule out the possibility that some of these teachers may have taught in other states
before arriving in Georgia. However, the results in the paper are robust to reducing the cutoff age which removes
teachers most likely to have taught elsewhere. Evidence in Rivkin et al. (1998) that teachers gain valuable
experience during early years of teaching is one motivation for studying new teachers.
8
For an individual elementary school, this test score is the mean of the 3rd grade Reading and Math exams.
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transition when he/she leaves his/her first teaching job. Of the 11,070 new teachers in our sample,
4,222 (38 percent) remain at the same school through the end of the sample period, and thus have a
censored spell. However, Table 2 indicates that a large proportion of new teachers end their first
teaching spell by changing schools. During the sample period, 20.9 percent of all teachers end their
first teaching job by moving to a new school in the same school district and 12.4 percent of all
teachers end their first teaching job by moving to a teaching position in another school district.
To provide information about yearly transition rates, we aggregate over all person-years in
the first teaching jobs of all individuals in our sample. We find that a person makes the decision to
remain in his/her first school (i.e., does not leave his/her first teaching job) in 0.714 of these personyears. The yearly proportions associated with other transitions are as follows: accepting a new
teaching job in the same school district (0.094); accepting a new teaching job in a different school
district (0.052); accepting an administrative or other non-teaching job in the education sector (0.043);
accepting a non-education sector job (0.016); and exiting the Georgia workforce entirely (0.082).10

III. The Role of School Characteristics in Teacher Mobility and Retention
In this section, we analyze the role of school characteristics on teacher mobility and retention.
In Section III.1, we use univariate tabulations to examine whether school characteristics in first jobs
are different for those who exit these first jobs and those that do not exit these first jobs. In Section
III.2, we present results from a linear probability model and results from a competing risks model
that allow us to examine the relative importance of school characteristics in explaining exits from

9

We use PBLACK to represent the proportion of students in a school that are black and we use BLACK to indicate
whether a particular teacher is black. The proportion of the sample that is not non-Hispanic black or white is very
small–less than 2 percent.
10
The small proportion associated with accepting a non-education job in Georgia is consistent with Stinebrickner
(2001) and Stinebrickner (2002) who found that women who leave teaching often leave the workforce altogether for
reasons related to marriage and fertility. An examination of what teachers do when they leave teaching is the focus
of Scafidi et al. (2002).

7

first teaching jobs. Finally in Section III.3, we show how school characteristics change for teachers
who move between schools.

III.1 Univariate Analysis of Teacher Turnover
A teacher’s decision to leave his/her first teaching job may depend on both wages and nonpecuniary characteristics of schools.11 In this subsection, we examine whether teachers who remain
in their first teaching job have, on average, different school characteristics than those who leave their
first teaching job for each of the possible exit activities that we described above and for all of the exit
activities aggregated. Specifically, using all person-years in the first teaching jobs of all individuals
in our sample, Table 3 shows the average school characteristics at time t for those who remained in
the first teaching job at time t+1 (column 1), those who accepted a new teaching job in the same
school district at time t+1 (column 2), those who accepted a new teaching job in a different school
district at time t+1 (column 3), those who accepted an administrative or other non-teaching job in the
education sector at time t+1 (column 4), those who accepted a non-education sector job at time t+1
(column), those who exited the Georgia workforce entirely at time t+1 (column 6), and those who
exited for any of the activities in columns 2-6 (column 7).12

11

Mandated by state law and updated annually, Georgia public schools districts face a minimum salary schedule that
lists the minimum teacher salary that must be paid based on teacher certification status, experience, and education.
Variation in salary arises because local school districts may pay teachers a local supplement to the salary schedule,
and many do so. The standard deviation of salary for new teachers with no more than a bachelor’s degree in 199495 was about $3,500. Unlike parts of the U.S., there is no collective bargaining between teacher unions and local
school districts.
12
The total number of years contributed by a particular person is the total number of years that he remained in his
first teaching job. For example, if a person chose to remain in her first teaching job at the end of the first three years
of teaching and then changed to a new teaching job in the same district after the fourth year, then the school
characteristics in each of the first three years would contribute to the average associated with remaining in the first
teaching job and the school characteristics in the fourth year would contribute to the average associated with
changing to a new teaching job in the same district. An alternative descriptive approach that would produce
substantially bigger differences in average school characteristics would be to have school characteristics contribute
to the average associated with remaining in the first teaching job only if the person never leaves the first teaching
job during the sample period. We choose our approach because it is most analogous to the empirical work in the
remainder of the paper.
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With respect to changing teaching jobs, the first three entries in the first row of Table 3 show
that wages of teachers at time t do not differ substantially between teachers who remain at their first
teaching job at time t+1 and teachers who change teaching jobs at time t+1. By contrast, the first
three entries of the fourth row of Table 3 show that the racial composition of schools (PBLACK) at
time t does differ significantly between teachers who remain at their first teaching job at time t+1 and
teachers who change teaching jobs at time t+1. Teachers who remain at their first school at time t+1
served a student population at time t that was on average 0.372 black. Teachers who move to other
schools within the same district at time t+1 served a student population at time t that was on average
0.393 black, while teachers who change districts at time t+1 served a student population at time t that
was on average 0.466 black.

A similar pattern exists for both the poverty status of students

(POVERTY) and the achievement test score (TEST). Teachers who move to other schools at time
t+1 taught in schools at time t that had higher poverty rates and lower test scores than teachers who
did not move to other schools, with larger differences for teachers who change school districts than
for teachers who change schools within a district.
With respect to leaving teaching for other education jobs, Table 3 indicates that teachers who
accept administrative or other non-teaching education jobs at time t+1 had lower wages and were in
schools with lower test scores, higher poverty rates, and higher proportions of minority students at
time t than teachers who remain in their same teaching job at time t+1. With respect to leaving
education jobs altogether, Table 3 indicates that teachers who leave teaching for a non-education
sector job or leave the Georgia workforce altogether at time t+1 were, on average, in schools with
higher proportions of black students at time t than teachers who remain in their same teaching job at
time t+1. By and large, there are no differences in the means of other school characteristics at time t
for those teachers who remain in their same teaching jobs at time t+1 and those who left teaching for
non-education jobs or left the Georgia workforce entirely at time t+1.
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The last column of Table 3 shows the school characteristics aggregated over all of the exit
activities in columns (2)-(6). The results show that teachers who leave teaching (for any of the exit
activities) in time t+1 had significantly lower wages and were in schools with lower test scores,
higher poverty rates, and higher proportions of minority students at time t than teachers who remain
in their same teaching job at time t+1. Tests of the null hypotheses that the means are the same for
those who exit and those who do not exit are rejected at traditional levels for each of the four school
characteristics at traditional values with t-statistics of !2.34, !11.62, 2.71, and 9.040 for WAGE,
TEST, POVERTY, and PBLACK respectively.

III.2 A Linear Probability and Competing Risks Analysis of Teacher Mobility and
Retention
The analysis in the previous section indicates that teachers who leave their first schools for
new teaching jobs were more likely to serve minority, disadvantaged, and lower achieving students
in the year prior to exiting than teachers who did not leave their first teaching jobs and that this
finding is driven to a large extent by those who left their first teaching jobs for other teaching jobs.
These three non-pecuniary school characteristics are highly correlated. The correlation between
PBLACK and POVERTY is 0.74. The correlation between PBLACK and TEST is -0.54, and the
correlation between POVERTY and TEST is -0.62. In contrast, teaching wages are not highly
correlated with student test scores, student poverty rates, or student racial composition (the
correlations are 0.09, -0.07, and 0.04, respectively).
The reality that these school characteristics are highly correlated combined with the policy
significance of determining the relative importance of the various characteristics in explaining
teacher exits motivates our estimation of two econometric models.

We first estimate a linear

probability model that does not distinguish between different possible exit activities. This model has
the virtues of being easy to interpret and not relying on any functional form assumptions. We then
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estimate a competing risks model that provides information about the relationship between
characteristics and each of the different possible exit activities that was examined in Table 3.

A Linear Probability Model
Using all person-years in the first teaching jobs of all individuals in our sample, we estimate
a linear probability model of the form:
(1)

Exitit="Xit+B(t)+uit

The dependent variable Exitit is equal to one if a person leaves his first teaching job after year t for
any of the activities in columns (2)-(6) of Table 3 and is equal to zero otherwise. Xit is the vector of
observable personal and school characteristics of teacher i at time t and are described in Table 1. B(t)
is a function which determines the relationship between the dependent exit variable and the number
of years, t, that a person has been in her first teaching spell. We assume a non-parametric form:
(2)

B (t) = * 1I(t=1)+ *2I(t=2) + * 3I(t=3)+...+* 6I(t=6)

where I is an indicator function that is equal to one if its argument is true. The number of terms in
equation (2) comes from the fact that a maximum number of six decision years can be observed for
teacher i.13

uit represents unobserved characteristics of teachers, school, and communities that

influence the exit decision.
The results from this specification are shown in Table 4. Most striking in Table 4 are the
results associated with the proportion of students in a school that are black, PBLACK. The point
estimate, 0.188, is both quantitatively and statistically large. With respect to the former, the point
estimate taken together with the standard deviation of PBLACK from Table 1 implies that a one
standard deviation increase in PBLACK raises the probability that a (non-black) teacher will leave
his/her first teaching in a particular year by approximately 0.06, or about twenty-one percent of the

13

The first teaching year is 1994-95. The last year of our sample is 2000-01.
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annual exit rate from teaching (0.286) that was described at the end of Section II. With respect to the
latter, a test of the null hypothesis that PBLACK has no effect on exits from first teaching jobs is
overwhelmingly rejected with a t-statistic of more than twelve.14 The interaction of PBLACK with
the indicator of whether a teacher is black (BLACK) indicates that black teachers are significantly
less likely to leave minority schools than are white teachers.
Thus, the multivariate results for PBLACK are consistent with the difference-in-means test
from the univariate tabulations described in the last paragraph of Section III.1 which produced a tstatistic of more than nine. Also similar in spirit to the univariate results from Table 3 is the estimate
associated with the teaching wage. A test of the null hypothesis that LOGWAGE has no effect on
mobility yields a t-statistic of -2.65 in Table 4 which is similar to the level of significance from the
difference-in-means test described in the last paragraph of Section III.1 for the univariate tabulations.
Not surprising given the difference in the level of significance between the PBLACK and the
LOGWAGE variable, the latter is found to have a much smaller quantitative effect than the former
with a one standard deviation increase in LOGWAGE decreasing the annual exit rate out of the first
teaching job by less than 0.01.
Unlike the findings for PBLACK and LOGWAGE, the results associated with TEST and
POVERTY highlight the importance of the multivariate model. For example, with respect to the
former variable, the difference-in-means test associated from the univariate tabulations produced a tstatistic of !11.62 in Table 3. However, the t-statistic associated with TEST falls to approximately
!1.62 in Table 4. With respect to POVERTY, the difference-in-means test from Section III.1
suggested that higher poverty was related to higher mobility (with a t-statistic of 2.71), but the results
in Table 4 indicate that this is not the case after conditioning on other school characteristics. In fact,
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We found little difference in our results when we estimated the model separately by sex. For example, the
estimated effect (std. error) of PBLACK was 0.189 (0.016) when the model was estimated separately for women and
was 0.172 (0.044) when the model was estimated separately for men.
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the results in Table 4 indicate that, after controlling for the other variables, higher poverty is related
to lower mobility.
Intuitively, the difference between the univariate and multivariate results for the TEST and
POVERTY variables arises primarily because these variables are strongly correlated with the
PBLACK variable, which plays a very important role in the mobility decision and with each other.
To confirm that this is the case, we estimated two additional specifications. In one alternative
specification we excluded the POVERTY and PBLACK variables and found that the estimated
coefficient on TEST was -0.002 with a t-statistic of -8.05 that is much more consistent with what was
found in the univariate analysis. In a second alternative specification we excluded the TEST and
PBLACK variables and found that, consistent with the univariate results, the point estimate
associated with POVERTY indicates that higher poverty is related to significantly higher mobility.
As expected, we also found that removing the TEST and POVERTY variables had virtually no effect
on the estimated effect of PBLACK.
Credibly estimating the causal impact of school characteristics in our data and also in the
data used by others in the teacher mobility/attrition literature is extremely difficult. One reason that
uit in equation (1) may be correlated with observed school characteristics is that observed school
characteristics may be related to other important characteristics of schools that are unobserved.
Another reason that uit may be correlated with observed school characteristics is that variation in
school characteristics across teachers is generated by the decisions of teachers and districts and these
decisions depend, at least in part, on unobserved preferences and quality of teachers. As such, in our
opinion, our results and the results in each of the other studies in this literature are best viewed as
being primarily “descriptive” in nature with a primary capability of providing policymakers with
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information about what types of schools have the highest turnover rates.15, 16 In this vein, we believe
that this paper makes an important contribution by providing new information about specific
perceptions that are common in policy discussion. As one prominent example, driven largely by a
belief that high attrition rates at schools are indicative of lower quality education, there has been
substantial reference to a perception that teachers are much more likely to leave high poverty
schools. Our results indicate that, while this perception is correct, it occurs because teachers are
more likely to leave a particular type of poor school - one that has a large proportion of minority
students. More generally, the main policy point from the linear probability model is very direct - if a
policymaker is interested in understanding retention and attrition issues, then it is of importance to
gain a better understanding of what is happening at schools with high minority rates.17
As mentioned earlier, the other work that is most similar to our approach is Hanushek et al.
(2004) who primarily examine exits out of school districts rather than exits out of particular schools.
Most comparable to our results in Table 4 are the Hanushek et al. (2004) results for a linear
probability model that examines exits for teachers who are in their first three years of teaching.18
Consistent with our results, the percentage of students that are black is the most important of the
15

This is not to suggest that understanding the causal impact of characteristics is not of importance. Indeed, it is our
opinion that future work that could explore issues related to causality and correlation in this context would be
extremely valuable.
16
Given our interest in providing information about this particular descriptive relationship, we did not pursue certain
other specifications such as those that include school district Fixed Effects (FE). In many contexts, it has been
suggested that FE specifications are useful for getting “closer” than OLS to a causal relationship. However, in this
context, it is certainly not clear that this would be the case. Indeed, if teachers tend to work in school districts where
they lived when young, then the across-district variation in school characteristics (that is removed by FE) may be
less susceptible to endogeneity problems than the within-district variation (that is used by the FE estimator for
identification) since the latter is generated by decisions of teachers and school districts during the initial school
matching process. While the relationship identified by a FE specification could certainly be interpreted in a
descriptive manner, it is not the descriptive relationship that we are primarily interested in.
17
We also examined modifications to our specification that might help provide additional information about what
types of schools teachers are most likely to leave. For example, in order to examine whether the high rate of exits
from minority schools is related to the fact that these schools are more likely to be in cities, we estimated a model
that included an urban indicator variable. We found that this inclusion had very little effect on the estimated effect
of PBLACK with the t-statistic (coefficient) on PBLACK found to be 0.184 (11.648). The general message that the
minority status of a school is extremely important and that other characteristics play a much smaller role was found
to be very robust across additional specifications that included additional information (e.g., unemployment rates)
about the communities in which individuals live.
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variables in their regression both statistically and economically (with a t-statistic of over seven and a
point estimate of approximately two-thirds of what we find). Also consistent with our results, they
find that, conditional on other variables of the type we have also included, schools with higher
percentages of students that are eligible for free and reduced lunch do not have higher attrition rates
and that a student test score variable is statistically significant but at a much lower level of
significance than the black variable.19 In short, the general message from their paper and this one is
strikingly similar.

A Competing Risks Model
In this subsection, we analyse the impact of salary and school characteristics on each of the
various transitions made by teachers. Unlike the linear probability model used in the previous
subsection, the competing risks hazard model used here makes distinctions between various possible
reasons that a person may leave his/her first teaching job. Specifically, the model distinguishes
between remaining in the same school (F) and exiting to a teaching job in another school within the
same district (W), exiting to a teaching job in another district (D), exiting to a non-teaching job (other
than full-time teaching) within the Georgia public education system (E), exiting to another job
outside the Georgia public education system (N), and exiting out of the Georgia workforce altogether
(O).20 While the empirical model described in the previous subsection is useful for analyzing overall
teacher turnover, it is useful to know something about the relationship between salary, school
characteristics, and these individual transitions.
18

See the first column of Table 7 in Hanushek et al. (2004).
When the linear model is estimated using teachers with 3-5 years of experience Hanushek et al. (2004) find a
significant effect of POVERTY, but as in our case the effect indicates teachers are less likely to leave high poverty
schools after conditioning on other characteristics. The t-statistic associated with the test score variable is 2.69 in
their work and 1.62 in our Table 4.
20
An alternative would be to specify a continuous time competing risks model and to compute likelihood
contributions on the basis of the interval in which a person left his/her first teaching job. This is the approach taken
19
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The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. Define Pitj to be the probability that at the
end of his/her tth year in teaching, teacher i chooses activity j, j=F,W,D,E,N,O, for time t+1. There
are two cases to consider. First, suppose a person’s spell in teaching at his/her first job is censored
after S years in teaching. In this case, the likelihood contribution for teacher i is the probability that
at the end of years 1,2,...,S-1, the person decides to return to teaching at the first school for the next
year:
(3)

Li = Pi1F • Pi 2F • ... • PiSF−1 .
The likelihood contribution is similar in the alternative case where the person is not censored.

Suppose a person teaches for S years in his first teaching job and then leaves teaching at the first
school for option k0{W,D,E,N,O}. In this case, the likelihood contribution for the person is the joint
probability that at the end of years 1, 2,...,S-1, the person decides to return to teaching for the next
year and decides at the end of year S to have activity state k in time S+1:
(4)

Li = Pi1F • Pi 2F • ... • PiSF−1 . • PiSk
We define Pitj to have a multinomial logit form:

(5)

Pitj =

e X it β
e X it β

F

+ B F (t )

+ e X it β

W

+ BW ( t )

+ e X it β

D

+ B D (t )

j

+ B j (t )

+ e X it β

E

+ B E (t )

+ e X it β

N

+ B N (t )

+ e X it β

O

+ BO (t )

where Xit is the vector of observable personal and school characteristics of teacher i at time t and are
described in Table 1. B j(t) is a function which is used to determine how the probability of choosing a
particular option j changes with the number of years, t, that a person has been in her teaching spell.
We assume the same non-parametric form that we used in the linear probability model:
(6)

B j(t) = * j1I(t=1)+ * j2I(t=2) + * j3I(t=3)+...+* j6I(t=6) .

by Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) and Stinebrickner (2002). Some preliminary experimentation indicated that
our results are not sensitive to our choice of a continuous time or a discrete time model.
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The likelihood function for the sample is given by

∏ L . 21
i

The coefficient vector $ F and the

i

coefficients in $ (t) are normalized to zero
F

so that the remaining coefficient vectors $ j,

j=W,D,E,N,O and the parameters of $ j(t), j=W,D,E,N,O are the effects relative to the option of
remaining in the first teaching job.
The estimation results from the competing risks model are shown in Table 5. There is a
small amount of evidence in Table 5 that wages impact teacher exits from their first teaching job. In
particular, we find no evidence of a relationship between teaching wages and exits to occupations
outside of the public education sector or exits out of the Georgia workforce and generally only weak
evidence of a relationship between teaching wages and other types of exits.22
While wages are the characteristic that has been most often studied in the past, what is by far
the most striking in Table 5 is the effect of student racial composition. A motivation for employing
the competing risks model is that it allows us to examine whether the strong relationship between
PBLACK and teacher exits that is observed in the linear probability model is driven primarily by
substantial increases in the exit probabilities associated with a small number of the exit activities.
While there are some differences in statistical significance by exit activity, the results strongly
suggest that this is not the case. Relative to remaining in the same school, teachers in schools with
higher proportions of black students (PBLACK) are significantly more likely to change teaching jobs
within the same district, to change teaching jobs by moving to new districts, to leave teaching for
non-education jobs, and to leave the Georgia workforce altogether. The t-statistics associated with
these effects are 3.15, 9.31, 6.49, and 10.72 respectively.23 The interaction of PBLACK with the

21

In this specification, conditional on the observable characteristics, the year specific likelihood contributions are
independent.
22
There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between teaching wages and exits to other education
jobs (t-statistic of -4.56). However, as shown in Table 2, relatively few teachers (7.3 percent) make this transition.
In addition, tests of the null hypotheses that teaching wages have no effect on exits to new schools in the same
district and exits to new schools in new districts respectively can be rejected, but only at significance levels greater
than approximately .11.
23
There are a variety of ways that policymakers may find the competing risks analysis, which disaggregates the
single exit category used in the linear probability model, to be useful. For example, if it had been observed that
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indicator of whether a teacher is black (BLACK) indicates that black teachers are significantly less
likely to leave minority schools than are white teachers.
Table 5 also reveals that POVERTY has an insignificant effect on transitions to both types of
new teaching jobs and that the TEST variable has estimated effect t-statistics of -1.51 and -1.81 in the
equations related to movements to a new school in the same district and a new school in a new
district respectively.24 Thus, the results suggest that the univariate relationships between teacher job
changes and the POVERTY and TEST variables that were found in Section III.1 are to a large extent
driven by their correlation with the other school characteristics in the model, most notably the racial
makeup of schools. As in the linear probability model, we confirmed this using two additional
specifications. In one alternative specification we excluded the TEST and PBLACK variables and
found that the estimated coefficient on POVERTY was 1.201 (t-statistic of 11.04) in the change
districts transition and 0.353 (t-statistic of 4.14) in the new school/same district transition. In a
second alternative specification we excluded the POVERTY and PBLACK variables and found that
the estimated coefficient on TEST was -0.017 (t-statistic of -8.97) in the change districts transition
and -0.004 (t-statistic of -3.07) in the new school/same district transition.
In order to quantify the importance of the various school characteristics, we use our estimates
in Table 5 to compute the first-year exit probability associated with each of the exit reasons for a

PBLACK was related to only exits out of teaching altogether, one possible interpretation would have been that an
initial teaching assignment in a particular type of school tends to influence how teachers view teaching more
generally. However, the fact that many teachers who start in schools with large proportions of black students
change schools rather than exiting teaching altogether suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, the fact
that teachers in these schools have opportunities to move to other types of schools raises the possibility that many
teachers may know in advance that their stays in these types of schools may be relatively short. That is, it is
possible that a teacher may initially accept a job in particular type of school just to “get her foot in the door.” While
understanding the process by which people decide whether to initially enter teaching (or whether to accept certain
types of initial teaching jobs) is an important research topic, our data is not well-suited for examining this issue.
24
POVERTY is found to have a positive effect on transitions to other education sector jobs (t-statistic of 2.21), and,
curiously we find a negative and statistically significant effect of POVERTY on transitions to non-education sector
jobs and out of the Georgia workforce. This result is consistent with the findings in Hanushek et al. (2004) and
Clotfelter et al. (2002). Both studies find that the percent of students in poverty has a negative effect on exits from
teaching. In earlier work, Scafidi, et al. (2002) find that adding measures of local labor market conditions (county
and region unemployment rate and earnings, and region dummy variables) as explanatory variables does not have
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“baseline” person at a “baseline school” and then compare these probabilities to those obtained after
changing the values of the school characteristics one at a time.25 As shown in Table 6, for the
baseline person the sum of the first-year exit probabilities associated with the five possible transition
risks is 29.7 percent. Increasing wages by one standard deviation ($4,674) decreases the predicted
probability of leaving the first job in the first year by only one percentage point. Increasing test
scores at the baseline school by one standard deviation (14.69 points) decreases the probability of
leaving the first job in the first year by only one-half of one percentage point. Increasing the school’s
poverty rate by one standard deviation (0.27) decreases the probability of leaving the current school
by about eight-tenths of a percentage point. Thus, although there are statistically significant impacts
of student test scores, poverty rates, and wages on a small number of teacher transitions, the overall
impacts of these school characteristics on teacher mobility and retention are quite small. By contrast,
increasing the proportion of black students by one standard deviation (0.32) increases the probability
of leaving the first job in the first year by 6.5 percentage points. This 22 percent increase is
consistent with what was found using the linear probability model.

III.3 Changes in School Characteristics Associated with Changing Schools
The analyses in the previous section suggest that teachers who serve higher proportions of
minority students are more likely to leave their first teaching job – by moving to new schools within
their districts, by moving to new districts, and by taking jobs outside of the public education sector.
Although this analysis utilizes only the school characteristics in a teacher’s first teaching job, it
suggests that we should perhaps expect that the schools to which teachers move will be substantially
different than the schools that they leave. In this section, we examine this issue by computing the

much of an impact on the magnitude or significance of the impact of wages or school characteristics on teacher
transitions.
25
The baseline person is a non-black female teacher with all other explanatory variables set to the sample means.
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changes in wages and school characteristics that are experienced by teachers who move to new
schools. These results are displayed separately in Table 7 for teachers who change schools within the
same district (column 1) and teachers who change districts (column 2).
Given annual changes in salary, our data indicate that teachers who remained in their first
teaching jobs received an annual wage increase of approximately $1,820 during the sample period.
Thus, Table 7 shows that the wage increases experienced by teachers who changed teaching jobs are
not substantially higher (less than 1 percent) than the increases experienced by teachers who did not
change jobs. However, consistent with what we might expect given our previous findings, Table 7
indicates that teachers who changed schools did experience changes in non-pecuniary school
characteristics. Teachers who moved to new schools within their first school district experienced an
average increase in TEST of 3.37 points and average decreases in POVERTY and PBLACK of 5.4
and 3.9 percentage points, respectively.26 Teachers who moved to new schools in different districts
experienced an average increase in TEST of 8.0 points and average decreases in POVERTY and
PBLACK of 11.7 and 13.3 percentage points, respectively.
The changes in school characteristics for movers in the present study are consistent with the
univariate analysis in Lankford, et al. (2002), which reports that New York State teachers tend to
move away from disadvantaged students in a similar fashion. These changes for movers are also
broadly consistent with evidence from the California class size reduction that began in the mid
1990s. The sudden and large decrease in class sizes mandated by the state of California created new
teacher positions in virtually every school in the state. As reported in Reichardt (2000) and Betts, et
al. (2000), incumbent teachers who served lower achieving, minority, and low-income students were
more likely to transfer to schools that had less of these types of students.

26

Test scores are recorded only for teachers who move to another elementary school. A handful moved to middle or
high schools.
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V. Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide new information about the types of schools
where turnover is the highest. We find strong evidence that students with large percentages of black
students have much higher attrition rates than other types of schools. While there are many reasons
to think that such results would vary to some extent based on the demographic nature and educational
systems of different states, the message from our work is remarkably similar to that of Hanusek et al.
(2004) who study teachers in the state of Texas.
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There are many reasons that policymakers may find it useful to have a better understanding
of the attrition rates at various types of schools. Prominent among these is a concern that, if attrition
is concentrated at particular types of schools, then certain types of students may systematically
receive a lower quality education than other students. On one hand, suppose that teachers receive less
enjoyment in minority schools for reasons unrelated to teaching effectiveness. In this case, teachers
of all quality will want to leave these schools and it will likely be the better teachers who will be able
to find new principals who agree to hire them. Thus, under the seemingly reasonable assumption that
minority schools do not get better new hires than other schools, it seems likely that high attrition
rates at black schools will tend to be indicative of lower quality education in this case. However,
conclusions tend to be more ambiguous if some subset of teachers find teaching less enjoyable
because they are less effective teaching in minority schools and the high attrition rates result from
these teachers finding better school matches. In this case, it will be the teachers who are more
effective in minority schools who will remain and minority schools may only be worse than other
schools to the extent that it takes the less effective teachers time to leave these schools or to the
extent that there are not enough teachers who are effective at teaching in minority schools to fill all
of the positions at these schools.27
At first glance, the discussion in the paper might suggest that it is quite plausible to believe
that some subset of teachers are less effective teaching in black schools; one might think that black
schools like other high poverty schools may be challenging places to teach effectively and teacher

27

For simplicity, this discussion focuses on teachers who are changing schools. At an intuitive level, one might
think that teachers who leave first teaching jobs for other teaching jobs may be of higher quality than those who
leave first teaching jobs for other exit activities such as taking care of young children. One reason that one might
expect this is that, in order to change teaching jobs, one typically has to find a principal who is willing to accept the
teacher while this type of review is not needed to leave the workforce altogether. In this case, knowing whether or
not the high rate of exits from minority schools is generated primarily by exits to particular types of activities may
provide information that is useful for thinking about potential quality implications of turnover at these schools. Our
competing risks model finds that the proportion of students that are black has strong relationships to virtually all of
the exit reasons.
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characteristics such as energy, motivation, and patience, which are presumably valuable in these
types of schools, may be possessed by only a subset of teachers. However, if race per se does not
make a particular student more difficult to teach, our empirical finding that high attrition rates do not
appear in high poverty, low test score, non-minority schools casts a serious doubt on the plausibility
of believing that the force driving mobility in minority schools is differences in teaching
effectiveness generated by general characteristics such as motivation, energy, and patience. In
particular, it would have to be the case that (1) the TEST and POVERTY variables do not fully
measure the factors that determine how challenging it is to teach effectively in a particular school and
(2) the portion not captured by these variables is both spuriously being attributed to the PBLACK
variable in our empirical work and happens to be the portion that requires general teacher attributes
such as energy, motivation, and patience.

If these conditions are not satisfied, one needs

explanations in which some subset of teachers are more effective teaching black students for reasons
directly related to race. One obvious possibility is that black teachers are more effective at teaching
black students than non-black teachers.28 However, as discussed in detail earlier in this section,
while this explanation may imply that minority schools tend to replace departing teachers with
teachers who on average are more effective, it suggests that minority schools will be of lower quality
if there does not exist enough black teachers to staff all black schools.
We note that the specifications in the paper undoubtedly suffer from omitted school variables
that are potentially correlated with our PBLACK variable. As a result, it is important to note that
even if attrition is caused by preferences that are unrelated to teaching effectiveness, it is very
possible that teachers find teaching in black schools to be less enjoyable for reasons unrelated to

28

There is a large literature focused on how the race and gender of faculty relate to students of different race and
gender. Generally, the focus of this research has been on such issues as the attitudes towards and expectations of
students, but not student performance; this research is discussed by Ehrenberg and Brewer (1995). We identified one
paper that addressed the relationship between the race of a teacher and the performance of students. Using the
National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988, Ehrenberg, Goldhaber and Brewer (1995) find that “for the most
part [the race, gender and ethnicity of the teacher] did not affect how much students learned.”
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simple racial bias. However, given that black teachers are not more likely to leave black schools than
white schools, omitted school variables of relevance must influence white teachers differently than
black teachers. The type of possibility that would be relevant is that white teachers may tend to live
further from black schools than black teachers.
The discussion suggests that future research that provides direct evidence about the
relationship between teacher turnover and teacher quality would be very valuable.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS - FIRST YEAR OF TEACHING SPELL
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

WAGE

29783

4674

LOGWAGE - Log(Wage)

10.35

0.155

TEST - Test score students*

53.28

14.69

POVERTY - Proportion of students in poverty**

0.464

0.273

PBLACK - Proportion of black students

0.388

0.319

MALE - Teacher is male

0.125

0.33

BLACK - Teacher is black

0. 167

0.373

BLACK*PBLACK

0.112

0.281

N= 11,070
*Student test score equals the average 3rd grade percentile rank on the Iowa Test of
Basic Skills Exam (ITBS Math + ITBS Reading)/2.
**POVERTY is the proportion of children in school eligible for free or reduced price
lunch.

TABLE 2: TEACHER TRANSITIONS
Transition Category

Number of Teachers

Percent of Teachers

4222

38.1%

Same School*
New School / Same District

2319

20.9%

New District

1374

12.4%

Other Education Sector Job

803

7.3%

Non-Education Sector job**

343

3.1 %

Out of GA Workforce

2009

18.1%

Total

11070

100.0%

*Teachers who remained at the same school the entire sample period.
**Former teachers who earned less than $10,000 in a non-education sector job were
classified as out of the GA workforce.

TABLE 3: SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS IN PRIOR YEAR BY TRANSITION CATEGORY
(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Same
School

New School/
Same
District

(2)

New
District

Other Educ
Sector Job

Non-Educ
Sector Job

Out of GA
Workforce

(7)
Exit for
Any Reason
(2)-(6)

WAGE

31711

31595

31,422*

30,617***

31704

31833

31,549***

TEST

54.47

53.25***

51 .00***

53.00***

52.47*

54.17

53.01***

POVERTY

0.461

0.481**

0.535***

0.501***

0.436

0.458

.485***

PBLACK

0.372

0.393**

0.466***

0.397*

0.427***

0.406***

.414***

(1)

***statistically significant from mean in column (1) at p<.001.
**statistically significant from mean in column (1) at p<.01.
*statistically significant from mean in column (1) at p<.05.
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TABLE 4: LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL OF TEACHER TRANSITIONS
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Stat

Log Teaching Wage

-0.058

0.022

-2.65

*1
*2
*3
*4
*5
*6
MALE
BLACK Teacher
TEST Score Students
POVERTY Students
PBLACK Students
BLACK x PBLACK

0.402
0.374
0.389
0.403
0.395
0.427
0.007
0.031
-0.0003
-0.038
0.188
-0.209

0.052
0.053
0.054
0.056
0.058
0.062
0.008
0.016
0.0002
0.016
0.015
0.024

7.69
6.97
7.09
7.14
6.77
6.89
0.83
1.89
-1.62
-2.34
12.47
-8.60
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TABLE 5: COMPETING RISKS MODEL OF TEACHER TRANSITIONS
Risk

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Stat

Log Teaching Wage

-0.274

0.172

-1.60

*1

-1.383

0.411

-3.37

*2

-1.485

0.422

-3.52

*3

-1.468

0.432

-3.40

*4

-1.29

0.444

-2.90

*5

-1.217

0.458

-2.66

*6

-1.143

0.484

-2.36

MALE

0.116

0.066

1.75

BLACK Teacher

0.124

0.134

0.92

TEST Score Students

0.003

0.002

-1.51

POVERTY Students

0.057

0.131

0.43

PBLACK Students

0.373

0.118

3.15

BLACK x PBLACK

-0.611

0.196

-3.12

Log Teaching Wage

-0.361

0.219

-1.65

*1

-2.105

0.524

-4.02

*2

-2.034

0.538

-3.78

*3

-1.874

0.549

-3.41

*4

-2.103

0.566

-3.71

*5

-2.031

0.586

-3.47

*6

-1.856

0.62

-3.00

MALE

0.0004

0.09

0.005

BLACK Teacher

0.661

0.172

3.85

TEST Score Students

-0.005

0.002

-1.81

POVERTY Students

0.212

0.166

1.27

PBLACK Students

1.325

0.142

9.31

BLACK x PBLACK

-2.122

0.255

-8.32

Log Teaching Wage

-1.322

0.29

-4.56

*1

-0.177

0.685

-0.26

*2

-0.79

0.706

-1.12

*3

-0.842

0.724

-1.16

*4

-0.523

0.744

-0.70

*5

-0.32

0.768

-0.42

*6

0.241

0.799

0.30

New School/Same District

New District

Other Education Sector Job

Table 5 continues next page…
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED): COMPETING RISKS MODEL OF TEACHER TRANSITIONS
Risk
Other Education Sector Job
(continued)

Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Stat

MALE

0.099

0.111

0.89

BLACK Teacher

-0.112

0.232

-0.48

TEST Score Students

0.002

0.003

0.56

POVERTY Students

0.481

0.217

2.21

PBLACK Students

0.148

0.197

0.75

BLACK x PBLACK

-0.004

0.33

-0.01

Log Teaching Wage

-0.238

0.43

-0.55

*1

-2.573

1.023

-2.52

*2

-2.908

1.053

-2.76

*3

-2.518

1.074

-2.35

*4

-2.662

1.107

-2.40

*5

-3.504

1.186

-2.96

*6

-4.245

1.516

-2.80

MALE

0.553

0.138

4.02

BLACK Teacher

0.321

0.327

0.98

TEST Score Students

-0.011

0.004

-2.57

POVERTY Students

-1.882

0.326

-5.78

PBLACK Students

1.832

0.282

6.49

BLACK x PBLACK

-1.238

0.472

-2.62

Log Teaching Wage

0.124

0.184

0.67

*1

-2.542

0.442

-5.75

*2

-2.658

0.454

-5.86

*3

-2.592

0.464

-5.59

*4

-2.467

0.476

-5.18

*5

-2.751

0.495

-5.55

*6

-2.611

0.526

-4.96

MALE

-0.188

0.078

-2.42

BLACK Teacher

-0.056

0.159

-0.36

TEST Score Students

0.001

0.002

0.41

POVERTY Students

-0.719

0.142

-5.06

PBLACK Students

1.318

0.123

10.72

BLACK x PBLACK

-1.173

0.228

-5.14

Non-Education Sector Job

Out of GA Workforce

N=11,070
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TABLE 6: EFFECT OF WAGES AND SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS ON LEAVING CURRENT SCHOOL
Probability of Leaving Current School
Baseline**

WAGE

TEST

POVERTY

PBLACK

29.74%

28.86%

29.22%

28.91%

36.25%

*Table shows the probability of leaving first teaching job after the first year for any reason. The first column shows the
probability for a baseline person. The 2nd-5th columns show probabilities when WAGE, TEST, POVERTY, and
PBLACK are increased by one standard deviation respectively.
** Baseline probabilities are computed from the estimates of the competing risks model
for a non-black female teacher with all other variables set to their sample means.

TABLE 7: CHANGES IN WAGES AND SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS OF MOVERS

WAGE

(1)
New School/
Same District
2.134

(2)
New District
1916

TEST*

3.37

7.98

POVERTY

-0.054

-0.117

PBLACK

-0.039

-0.133
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